

Message Text

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ACTION EA-14

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2789

AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY

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UNCLAS SECTION 1 OF 2 SAIGON 3565

1. SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST: THERE FOLLOWS TEXT OF A GVN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MFA) COMMUNIQUE WHICH WILL BE RELEASED AT 0900 AM, MARCH 19, SAIGON TIME. ACTION REQUEST. ACTION ADDRESSES ARE REQUESTED TO PASS THE TEXT TO THE GVN REPRESENTATIVES IN THEIR HOST COUNTRIES ALONG WITH THE RELEASE TIME. FOR BRASILIA OR BUENOS AIRES: PLEASE SEND EXTRA COPY FOR THE PERSONAL ATTENTION OF FOREIGN MINISTER VUONG VAN BAC FROM LE QUANG GIAN OF MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. END SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST.

2. BEGIN TITLE. COMMUNIQUE OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM OF MARCH 19, 1974 MARKING ONE YEAR OF NEGOTIATION AT THE LA-CELLE ST-CLOUD CONFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO SOUTH VIETNAMESE SIDES. END TITLE.

3. BEGIN TEXT. THE TWO SOUTH VIETNAMESE SIDES HAVE BEEN NEGOTIATING FOR EXACTLY ONE YEAR AT THE LA-CELLE-ST-CLOUD CONFERENCE WITHOUT REACHING ANY SATISFACTORY RESULT. DURING THAT TIME, IN SOUTH VIETNAM, THE SOUND OF GUNFIRE CONTINUED TO BE HEARD, SOLDIERS OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM KEPT FALLING ON THE BATTLE-FIELDS, AND THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE STILL HAD TO ENDURE ENDLESS SUFFERINGS AND MOURNINGS.

4. THIS SAD SITUATION IS DUE ENTIRELY TO THE BAD FAITH OF THE COMMUNISTS. ON THIS OCCASION MARKING ONE YEAR OF NEGOTIATIONS AT LA-CELLE-ST-CLOUD, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM DEEMS IT NECESSARY TO EXPOUND TO PUBLIC OPINION ITS EFFORTS TO SOLVE THE PROBLEMS OF SOUTH VIETNAM DURING THE PAST YEAR, AND THE NEGATIVE RESPONSE OF THE COMMUNIST SIDE COMPARED TO THE GOODWILL OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM.

5. AT THE LA-CELLE-ST-CLOUD CONFERENCE, THE DELEGATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM HAS MADE CONCRETE AND CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSALS WHICH SHOW CLEARLY ITS WILL TO REACH A PEACEFUL SOLUTION FOR SOUTH VIETNAM, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SPIRIT AND LETTER OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT.

6. CONCERNING THE FORM IN WHICH THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE HELD,
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THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM'S DELEGATION HAS PROPOSED THAT:

--BOTH SIDES STOP CRITICIZING EACH OTHER SO AS TO CREATE A SERENE AND CONCILIATORY ATMOSPHERE.

--BOTH SIDES DISCUSS TOGETHER EVERY MATTER THAT NEEDS TO BE SETTLED WITH A VIEW TO REACHING A GLOBAL SOLUTION FOR SOUTH VIETNAM.

7. THIS APPROACH WOULD ALLOW BOTH SIDES TO EXAMINE EACH OTHER'S

MATTERS OF CONCERN AND DEMANDS, THUS FACILITATING BARGAINING AND COMPROMISE IN A SPIRIT OF MUTUAL CONCESSION.

8. SUCH BARGAININGS AND COMPROMISES CAN ONLY TAKE PLACE IN DISCREET TALKS FREE FROM ALL PROPAGANDA PURPOSES. FOR THIS REASON, THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM'S DELEGATION BELIEVES THAT BESIDES OPEN TALKS AT LA-CELLE-ST-CLOUD CASTLE, BOTH SIDES SHOULD HOLD RESTRICTED AND CLOSED MEETINGS DURING WHICH THEY COULD TALK OPENLY AND FRANKLY.

9. AS FOR THE SUBSTANCE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM HOLDS THAT THE SOLUTION REACHED BY THE TWO SIDES MUST ABSOLUTELY RESPECT THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION OF THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM AND THAT THIS RIGHT MUST BE EXERCISED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THEREFORE, AT THE LA-CELLE-ST-CLOUD CONFERENCE, THE DELEGATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM HAS THREE TIMES PUT FORTH PROPOSALS TO HOLD EARLY GENERAL ELECTIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

10. ON APRIL 25, 1973, THE DELEGATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM PROPOSED THAT GENERAL ELECTIONS BE HELD ON AUGUST 26, 1973.

11. ON JUNE 28, 1973, THE DELEGATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM PROPOSED THAT GENERAL ELECTIONS BE ORGANIZED FOR DECEMBER 25, 1973.

12. ON JANUARY 18, 1974, THE DELEGATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ONCE AGAIN PROPOSED THAT GENERAL ELECTIONS BE HELD ON JULY 20, 1974.

13. EACH TIME, ALONG WITH THE PROPOSAL FOR GENERAL ELECTIONS, THE DELEGATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ALSO SUGGESTED THAT BOTH SIDES MEET TOGETHER TO SETTLE ALL PENDING PROBLEMS BEFORE THE GENERAL ELECTIONS, SUCH AS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NATIONA
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14. OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE LA-CELLE-ST-CLOUD CONFERENCE, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM HAS INITIATED OTHER EFFORTS TO IMPLEMENT THE PARIS AGREEMENT AND TO ACHIEVE RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. ON JANUARY 26, 1974, THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM SOLEMNLY DECLARED THAT HE WAS READY TO MEET THE NORTH VIETNAMESE FOREIGN MINISTER, OR ANOTHER HIGH RANKING REPRESENTATIVE OF THE HANOI ADMINISTRATION, TO NEGOTIATE THE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN SOUTH AND NORTH VIETNAM, AND TO DISCUSS ALL MEASURES SUSCEPTIBLE OF EASING TENSIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM, AS WELL AS ALL MEASURES TO PRESERVE THE LONG-RANGE INTERESTS OF THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE.

15. TO THIS MAXIMUM GOODWILL AND THE PRACTICAL, OPEN- MINDED AND CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSALS OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, THE COMMUNIST SIDE HAS RECIPROCATED WITH AN EXTREMELY NEGATIVE AND STUBBORN ATTITUDE.

16. IT DID NOT RESPOND TO THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM'S PROPOSAL TO PUT AN END TO CRITICISMS. NEITHER DID IT ACCEPT TO HOLD

RESTRICTED AND CLOSED SESSIONS SO THAT BOTH SIDES COULD TALK OPENLY AND FRANKLY. IT REFUSED TO DISCUSS TOGETHER PROBLEMS WHICH NEED TO BE SOLVED SIMULTANEOUSLY. IT ARRANGED MATTERS FOR DISCUSSION IN A RIGID ORDER AND CONTENTED THAT PROBLEMS SHOULD BE SETTLED SUCCESSIVELY ACCORDING TO THAT ORDER. IT SYSTEMATICALLY TURNED DOWN THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM'S PROPOSALS ON HOLDING GENERAL ELECTIONS SO THAT THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE COULD SOON DECIDE THEIR POLITICAL FUTURE.

17. THE COMMUNISTS'S ATTITUDE AT THE LA-CELLE-ST-CLOUD CONFERENCE SHOWS THAT:

- THEY ONLY WANT TO USE THE CONFERENCE AS A PROPAGANDA PLATFORM, BUT DO NOT AGREE TO FRANK AND OPEN-MINDED TALKS.
- DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS, THEY NEVER THINK OF BARGAINING OR COMPROMISE IN A SPIRIT OF MUTUAL CONCESSION, BUT WANT THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM TO ACCEPT ALL THEIR DEMANDS. IT IS WHY THEY HAVE ARRANGED ALL PROBLEMS IN A RIGID ORDER AND ADVOCATED THAT THEY BE SOLVED SEPARATELY. IN THAT MANNER, THE COMMUNIST

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WOULD AGREE TO DISCUSS A QUESTION ONLY AFTER THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM WOULD HAVE ACCEPTED ALL THEIR DEMANDS ON THE PREVIOUS ONE. THUS, THE SOLVING OF A PREVIOUS QUESTION IS A PRECONDITION FOR DISCUSSING THE FOLLOWING ONE.

18. THE SETTING OF PRECONDITIONS BY THE COMMUNISTS, IN ADDITION TO THEIR INTENTION OF TRANSFORMING THE LA-CELLE-ST-CLOUD CONFERENCE INTO A PROPAGANDA PLATFORM, CLEARLY SHOWS THAT THEY DO NOT SINCERELY ACCEPT A POLITICAL SOLUTION FOR SOUTH VIETNAM IN A SPIRIT OF RECONCILIATION. THEY ONLY WANT TO PROLONG THE CURRENT TALKS AT LA-CELLE-ST-CLOUD WHILE TRYING TO GRAB MORE LAND AND CONTROL MORE POPULATION IN THEIR ATTEMPT TO WIN MILITARILY IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

19. THROUGH THE COMMUNISTS' ACTIONS DURING THE PAST YEAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM, EVERYBODY COULD SEE THEIR SCHEME OF AGGRESSION AND THEIR BELLICOSE ATTITUDE:

- THEY REPAIRED AND ENLARGED AT LEAST TWELVE MILITARY AIRFIELDS AND OPENLY BUILT MORE INFILTRATION CORRIDORS, SOUTH OF THE 17TH PARALLEL.
- THEY INTRODUCED FROM THE NORTH MORE THAN 100,000 TROOPS INTO SOUTH VIETNAM, ONE SAM-2 MISSILE REGIMENT, 600 TANKS, 600 PIECES OF ARTILLERY, AND AN IMPORTANT QUANTITY OF WAR MATERIAL OF ALL TYPES.
- THE COMMUNISTS CONTINUED THEIR MILITARY INTERFERENCE AND MAINTAINED ILLEGALLY THEIR TROOPS ON THE TERRITORIES OF THE KINGDOM OF LAOS AND OF THE KHMER REPUBLIC, IN FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 20 OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT.
- THEY ILLEGALLY FORMED NEW COMBAT DIVISIONS MADE UP OF FORMER PRISONERS RETURNED TO THEM BY THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM; IN THE MEANTIME THEY STILL DETAIN 70,255 CIVILIAN AND 26,645 MILI-

TARY PERSONNEL OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM.

--THEY NEVER STOPPED THEIR SYSTEMATIC VIOLATIONS OF THE
CEASEFIRE PROVISIONS OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT. THESE VIOLATIONS
EXCEEDED THE 39,000 MARK. NOT ONLY DID THE COMMUNISTS ATTACK
OR SHELL THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM'S BASES SUCH AS TONG LE CHAN,
LE MINH, KHIEM HANH, BU PRANG, BU DONG, KIEN DUC, AND
DAKSONG, THEY ALSO PERPETRATED TERRORIST ACTIVITIES, KILLING
INNOCENT CIVILIANS. THE MOST TYPICAL AND BARBAROUS CASE WAS
THEIR SHELLING OF THE CAI LAY PRIMARY SCHOOL ON MARCH 9, 1974,
THAT TOOK THE LIVES OF 32 SCHOOL CHILDREN, WOUNDED 34 OTHERS,
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PLUS ONE LADY TEACHER AND TWO STUDENTS' RELATIVES.

20. THE COMMUNISTS COULD NOT DENY THEIR RESPONSIBILITY FOR
THE ABOVE ACTIONS, BECAUSE THEIR LEADERS THEMSELVES, BY ORDERS
NOS 02/CT73/TUC/MN AND 03/CT73/TUC/MN ISSUED ON JANUARY 19,
1973, AND ON MARCH 30, 1973 AND BY RESOLUTION NO. 4R, HAD
INSTRUCTED COMMUNIST UNITS TO INCREASE THEIR FIGHTING POTEN-
TIALS IN ORDER TO GRAB MORE LAND AND CONTROL MORE POPULATION
IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

21. THE DARK SCHEMES OF THE COMMUNISTS WERE ALSO REVEALED
THROUGH THEIR POLICY OF MAKING THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION
OF CONTROL AND SUPERVISION INOPERATIVE BY FIRING AT THE
COMMISSION'S AIRCRAFTS, SHELLING ITS HEADQUARTERS, DEMANDING
UNCEASINGLY A REDUCTION OF ITS PERSONNEL AND MAKING CUTS
IN ITS BUDGET. IF THE COMMUNISTS DID NOT HAVE THE DELIBERATE
INTENTION OF VIOLATING THE PARIS AGREEMENT, THEY WOULD NOT
HAVE TRIED SO SHAMELESSLY TO PARALYZE THE BODY WHOSE DUTY IS
TO CONTROL THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THAT AGREEMENT.

22. THE COMMUNISTS' BAD FAITH IS THEREFORE FULLY EVIDENT.
HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF THE EARNEST ASPIRATIONS FOR PEACE AMONG THE
PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
VIETNAM AFFIRMS THAT IT WILL RESPECT AND IMPLEMENT SERIOUSLY
ALL THE PROVISIONS OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT, AND CONTINUE ITS
SEARCH FOR AN ADEQUATE SOLUTION OF RECONCILIATION BASED ON
THE SACRED RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION OF THE PEOPLE OF
SOUTH VIETNAM.

23. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM HOWEVER DEEMS
IT NECESSARY TO DENOUNCE STRONGLY BEFORE DOMESTIC AND WORLD
OPINION THE COMMUNISTS' SCHEMES OF AGGRESSION AND THEIR ATTEMPTS
AT SABOTAGING THE PEACE. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
VIETNAM APPEALS TO ALL FREEDOM-LOVING PEOPLES TO ACTIVELY
SUPPORT THE EFFORTS OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AIMED AT SEAR-
CHING FOR A STABLE AND LASTING PEACE FOR SOUTH VIETNAM,
BY COMPELLING THE COMMUNISTS TO ACCEPT THE RIGHT OF THE
PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM TO DECIDE THEIR OWN POLITICAL FUTURE
THROUGH FREE GENERAL ELECTIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL SUPER-

VISION, AS PRESCRIBED BY THE PARIS AGREEMENT OF JANUARY 27,
1973. SAIGON, MARCH 19, 1974. END TEXT.

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